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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONY PEREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950333-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE CONVICTION FOR 
DRIVING WHILE UNLICENSED IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AND MUST BE VACATED. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 8-11) 
There being no dispute, this issue requires no further 
discussion or reply. Counsel for the State should be commended for 
his candor to the Court in resolving this issue without further 
burdening the resources of the Court. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF 
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING STATEMENTS 
MADE TO HIM BY JOSE ALCANTOR AS HEARSAY WAS 
BOTH ERROR AND PREJUDICIAL. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point II, pp. 11-
17) 
A. THE PROFFERED STATEMENTS WERE NOT OFFERED 
FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED, AND 
THUS FALL OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE 
HEARSAY RULE. 
The State asserts that the trial court properly sustained 
hearsay objections to appellant's attempts to testify concerning 
statements made by Jose Alcantor. E.g., State's brief at 11 ("II. 
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED THE STATE'S HEARSAY 
OBJECTIONS . . . " ) , 14 ("the objected-to questions and answers did 
ask for or give inadmissible hearsay"), and 15 n.5 ("Comparing 
this unobjected-to exchange to the earlier colloquies best 
illustrates the hearsay problems. Throughout the earlier 
discussions, defendant restated the words uttered by Al Cantor. C13 
In this exchange, however, the defendant only recollected the 
substance of the information that caused him to run and to believe 
the car was not stolen, not Al Cantor's precise words."). The 
State provides no legal analysis for its erroneous conclusion. 
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as 
follows: 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
ll!Alcantor" is spelled inconsistently in the record, appearing 
also as "al Cantor" or "Al Cantor." All such references are to the 
same individual. The correct spelling is unclear. 
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Emphasis added. As argued at length in appellant's opening brief 
at pp. 11-13, none of the statements were offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
Mr. Perez sought to testify concerning verbal acts. 
Appellant was entitled to testify that these acts occurred. E.g., 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah App. 1992) ("The 
trial court, however, admitted these statements as evidence of 
verbal acts, and not for their substantive truth."); Durfey v. 
Board of Educ. . 604 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1979) ("Therefore, 
utterances (or verbal acts), evidence of which is offered for some 
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter stated, a[re] 
not excludable as hearsay."); Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. 
Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959) ("His testimony did not 
purport to assure the truth of these statements but was a report 
about the conduct of people, including some of their verbal acts, 
as observed by him."); John C. Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 279 
P.2d 700, 705 (Utah 1955) ("Where the 'question is not whether the 
statements are true, but whether they were made'n such statements 
are not excluded by the rule against hearsay."); Hawkins v. Perry, 
253 P.2d 372, 374-5 (Utah 1953) ("Perry's statements at the time of 
the transaction were not declarations as to some antecedent 
happening which the percipient witnesses are relating to us 
second-hand. They are the verbal acts which go to make up the very 
transaction which is under scrutiny to determine its legal effect. 
The fact that promises and representations were made is material to 
the issues of this action . . . " ) . 
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The first statement, "Tony, Tony.", R. 289, is not a 
declarative statement. "Tony" can neither be true nor false. It 
is a verbal act, pure and simple. The next statement, "He said, 
'Do you want to go for a ride?'", R. 292, is a mere verbal act. 
While these statements by themselves have little or no evidentiary 
significance for Mr. Perez, they are illustrative of the 
fundamental misunderstanding of the hearsay rule by the prosecutor, 
the trial court, and now the Assistant Attorney General. The 
string of improper hearsay exclusions collectively deprived Mr. 
Perez of the opportunity to defend against the charges brought 
against him. 
The first substantive statement, "Yeah, he did [represent 
that the car was his].", R. 292, was also a verbal act. It was 
offered not for its truth,2 but rather to show that the statement 
was made and led to Mr. Perez's good faith belief that the car 
belonged to Mr. Alcantor. Mr. Perez was denied the opportunity to 
present his defense. 
The next statement, "He told me he bought the car.", R. 
292, follows the identical logic of the prior statement. The 
statement was admissible to show that the statement was made and 
led to Mr. Perez's good faith belief that the car belonged to Mr. 
Alcantor. Mr. Perez was again denied the opportunity to present 
his defense. 
The statement, "Q So why did you run, Tony? A 
Because he told me the car was stolen.", R. 299, was again a verbal 
2Nobody seriously contends that Mr. Alcantor owned the car. 
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act. It was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,3 
rather it was offered to show that the statement was made, was the 
first indication to Mr. Perez that the car was stolen, and caused 
him to flee the scene. For a third time, Mr. Perez was denied the 
opportunity to present his defense. 
Not one of the hearsay objections was properly taken. 
All the evidence was admissible, and should have been admitted. 
B. MR. PEREZ WAS PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS 
HEARSAY EXCLUSION OF HIS DEFENSE. 
The State's argument concerning the erroneous hearsay 
exclusion of Mr. Perez's testimony centers on the prejudice prong 
of the inquiry. Mr. Perez was prejudiced. 
The State cites State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140 
(Utah 1977) (Hall, J., concurring) in support of the proposition 
that any error was harmless. Butler is distinguishable: 
In fact, the court allowed defendant to 
testify, over objection, about the conversation with his 
wife wherein she related that the victim had threatened 
defendant with bodily harm. In light of this ruling 
allowing hearsay, the prior ruling prohibiting it, if 
error at all, was harmless error. 
560 P. 2d at 1136 (emphasis in original) . By overruling an 
objection to the testimony, the trial court made clear to the jury 
that the evidence was properly admissible and should be considered. 
Here, there was no objection at the time Mr. Perez was allowed to 
testify that he found out from Mr. Alcantor that the car was 
3Coincidentally, this statement was in fact true, although 
that fact in no way impacts the proper analysis under the hearsay 
rule. 
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stolen. In the wake of repeated exclusions on hearsay grounds, and 
absent any indication from the trial court that this evidence was 
properly admissible, there can be no confidence that the jury 
accepted this testimony at face value. 
The jury had just witnessed repeated sustained objections 
to Mr. Perez testifying about the statements of others. R. 289, 
291, 292, 297-8, 299. The trial court had admonished Mr. Perez: 
"Mr. Perez, don't tell us what anybody else said." R. 292. The 
jury instructions instructed that inadmissible and stricken 
testimony was not to be considered. Instruction 6 (R. 85) . Under 
the circumstances it is probable that the jury came away with the 
impression that Mr. Perez was not allowed to testify concerning 
statements made by others, and that all such testimony should be 
ignored and disregarded. The trial court's erroneous ruling 
prevented Mr. Perez from presenting his defense. 
Mr. Perez should be granted a new trial. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING JURY 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER NINETEEN. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point III, pp. 17-
20) 
The State correctly notes that Instruction 19 did not 
contain the words "shall" or "prima facie." However, the court in 
State v. Chambers, 709 P. 2d 321 (Utah 1985) did not limit its 
disapproval to "shall" and "prima facie": 
Thus, the statutory language should not be used in any 
form in instructing juries in criminal cases, and we 
expressly disavow the language and holdings of our 
earlier cases to the contrary. 
Chambers, 709 P. 2d at 327 (emphasis added) . The Supreme Court did 
not limit its holding to "shall" and "prima facie"; this Court 
should decline to do so. 
Appellant recognizes that permissive inference 
instructions have been approved. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 
412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) . This in no way 
limits the Utah Supreme Court's supervisory power to reach a 
different result. E.g., State v. Gordon, No. 940558, slip op. at 
6 (Utah 1996); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857 (Utah 1992); State 
v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 650 n.32 (Utah) , cert, denied, U.S. , 
116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 406 n.7 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he invocation of our supervisory 
powers . . . demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to 
prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language [in the 
reasonable doubt instruction]."), cert, denied, U.S. , 115 
S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995). 
For reasons stated as early as 1916, inference 
instructions are problematic: 
We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen 
property when the party in possession failed to make a 
satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of 
guilt, may do harm by singling out and emphasizing 
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other 
evidence which may be of equal or greater importance, 
and, without further explanation or direction, may tend 
to convey a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated 
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to 
the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires the 
verdict to be cast against him. 
Barretta. 155 P. 343, 346-47 (Utah 1916). 
The instruction at issue here provided: 
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Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession 
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that 
it was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then 
you may infer from these facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property and knew the property was 
stolen. 
Instruction 19, R. 98. 
This instruction suffers from each of the problems 
identified in Barretta: it singles out and emphasizes particular 
evidence in the case to the exclusion of other evidence which may 
be of equal or greater importance, and tends to convey to the jury 
that when such enumerated particulars are shown the burden of proof 
is shifted to the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires 
conviction. 
The instruction given here is markedly inferior to those 
upheld in other cases. The instruction in Barnes was as follows: 
Possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown 
by the evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession knew the property had been stolen. 
However, you are never required to make this 
inference. It is the exclusive province of the jury to 
determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by 
the evidence in this case warrant any inference which the 
law permits the jury to draw from the possession of 
recently stolen property. 
The term 'recently7 is a relative term, and has no 
fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as 
recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property, 
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and all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence 
in the case. The longer the period of time since the 
theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may 
reasonably be drawn from unexplained possession. 
If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from 
the evidence in the case that the mail described in the 
indictment was stolen, and that while recently stolen the 
contents of said mail here, the four United States 
Treasury checks, were in the possession of the defendant 
you would ordinarily be justified in drawing from those 
facts the inference that the contents were possessed by 
the accused with knowledge that it was stolen property, 
unless such possession is explained by facts and 
circumstances in this case which are in some way 
consistent with the defendant's innocence. 
In considering whether possession of recently stolen 
property has been satisfactorily explained, you are 
reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights 
the accused need not take the witness stand and testify. 
Possession may be satisfactorily explained through 
other circumstances, other evidence, independent of any 
testimony of the accused. 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. at 840 n.3, 93 S.Ct. at 2360 n.3, 
3 7 L.Ed.2d at 3 84 n.3 (emphasis added) . 
The first paragraph is the functional equivalent of the 
instruction given here. However, the jury here was not advised 
that they were not required to make the inference. The language of 
Instruction 19 was designed precisely to lead the jury into making 
the inference, in spite of any qualms the jurors might have. 
Certain evidence, i.e. possession, was unduly emphasized to the 
exclusion of other more probative evidence, i.e. testimony that 
Jose Alcantor picked appellant up in the car and claimed to own it. 
Instruction 19 also does not clarify that a reasonable 
explanation can arise from the facts and circumstances of the case, 
rather than solely the testimony of the defendant. The jury here 
was not reminded that the defendant had no obligation to testify. 
Viewing "satisfactory explanation" in the ordinary sense of the 
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words, the jury expects the defendant to explain. The instruction 
should have clarified that the facts and circumstances can explain 
the possession, rather than merely testimony of the defendant. 
As pointed out in appellant's opening brief, Instruction 
19 suffered the additional problem that it did not state that 
possession alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction; to the 
contrary, Instruction 19 stated that possession alone is sufficient 
to sustain a conviction. This is contrary to established Utah law. 
See opening brief at pp. 18-22, and cases cited therein. 
Mr. Perez was prejudiced by Instruction 19, and should be 
granted a new trial. 
* * * 
Mr. Perez relies on his opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not separately replied to here. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Perez respectfully requests that his conviction for 
driving while unlicensed be vacated and a judgment of acquittal be 
entered, and that his conviction for theft by receiving be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^tt day of March, 1996. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBIN K. YOUNGBERG 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber 
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ,37-tx. day of March, 1996. 
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Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of March, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Jury Instruction 19 (R. 85) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the person in possession of the stolen property stole the 
property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt ilj\ that the defendant was in possession of property, u2)Y 
that the property was stolen, f(3y that such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts 
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the 
property was stolen. 
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